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I.

INTRODUCTION

Traditionally, a company will raise money by issuing securities
that represent equity in the company or, in the case of debt securities,
entitle the holders to claims for repayment. Sometimes payment of
these claims is secured by a lien on certain of the company's properties. In each case, the securityholder looks primarily to the company
for repayment. If the company becomes financially troubled, or bankrupt, payment of the securities may be jeopardized, or at least
delayed.
Structured finance can change the securityholder's dependence
on the company for payment, by separating the source of payment
from the company itself. In a typical structured financing, a company
that seeks to raise cash may sell certaih of its assets to a special purpose vehicle or trust (hereinafter called the "SPV") that is organized
in such a way that the likelihood of its bankruptcy is remote. The
"sale" is accomplished iIi a manner that removes, to the e,:,tent practicable, these assets from the estate of the selling company in the event
of its bankruptcy. The result is that the assets are no longer owned by
the selling company, but by the bankruptcy remote vehicle or trust.
The assets themselves are typically payment obligations, such as accounts or other amounts receivable, owing to the company from
creditworthy third parties. (In this article, these payment obligations
are generically referred to as "receivables.")
The SPY, and not the selling company, will issue securities to
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tions on the receivables purchased by the SPY. A potential buyer of
the securities therefore looks to the cash flow from the purchased receivables, and not necessarily to the credit of the selling company, for
repayment.
This separation of the selling company (hereinafter called the
"originator," because it usually originates the receivables) from the
receivables themselves can enable the originator to raise funds less
expensively, through securities issued by the SPY, than it would cost
to raise funds through securities issued directly by the originator. In
addition, as illustrated in the attached chart, I the cash that is raised
will not require an offsetting liability to be shown on the originator's
balance sheet; from the standpoint of the originator, the cash represents proceeds of the sale of receivables to the SPY.
If the originator is a bank or similar financial institution that is
required to maintain risk based capital under the recent capital adequacy guidelines, 2 securitization also could permit the originator to
sell assets (for example, loans reflected as assets on the bank's financial statements) for which it would otherwise be required to maintain
capital. This reduces the bank's effective cost of funds.
Furthermore, an originator may be restricted by its indenture
covenants from incurring or securing debt beyond a specified level. A
structured financing may enable the originator to raise cash in compliance with such covenants, because the originator may be selling assets
and not incurring or securing debt. (Whether a structured financing
would violate particular covenants requires a case-by-case inquiry.)

II.

HISTORY

The first structured financings, identified as such, started in the
early seventies with the securitization of pools of mortgages. Initially,
mortgages were originated by savings and loan associations. These
institutions depended heavily on core deposit flows for funds to finance local housing demand. When the housing credit market collapsed during the Depression, Congress reacted by passing the
National Housing Act of 1934, intended in part to create a secondary
market in mortgages. To this end, the Federal National Mortgage
Association ("FNMA" or "Fannie Mae") was established in 1938 to
provide liquidity for mortgage investment by purchasing mortgages
when funds are in short supply, and selling mortgages when funds are
plentiful. As the nation's demand for housing increased after World
See Appendix.
See Capital Adequacy Guidelines for Bank Holding Companies and State Member
Banks: Leverage Measure, 12 C.F.R. § 225, app. B (1989).
1

2
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War II, a capital shortage developed, and alternative capital streams
were needed to finance the growing housing industry. In 1957, the
Federal Home Loan Bank Board created a credit reserve system for
savings and loan associations by permitting the purchase and sale of
participations in interests in mortgage loans.
The first structured financing came in 1970 when the newly created Government National Mortgage Association ("GNMA" or
"Ginnie Mae") began publicly trading "pass-through" securities. In a
mortgage pass-through security, the investor purchases a fractional
undivided interest in a pool of mortgage loans, and is entitled to share
in the interest income and principal payments generated by the underlying mortgages. Mortgage lenders originate pools of mortgages with
similar characteristics as to quality, term and interest rate. The pool
is then placed in a trust. Then, either through a government agency, a
private conduit or direct placement, certificates of ownership are sold
to investors. Income from the mortgage pool passes through to the
investors.
In recent years, many different types of assets have been the subject of securitization. Where the securities issued by the Spy are publicly issued, and where rating agencies-such as Standard & Poors
and Moody's-rate these securities, the assets purchased by the SPY
tend to be payment streams that have proven histories of past payment and predictable expectations of future payment. Examples
would include pools of mortgage loans, trade receivables and credit
card receivables.
On the other hand, where the securities are privately placed, and
in some recent transactions as the rating agencies become more comfortable with the credit issues involved with securitization, the assets
purchased by the Spy are becoming more creative. For example, recent deals have included payment streams consisting of franchise fees,
leases, subrogation claims and even utility surcharges.
III.

DEFINING THE SOURCE OF REPAYMENT

As can be seen, the common thread is that the receivables
purchased consist of a payment stream as to which there is a reasonable predictability of payment. Collections on the receivables would
be applied to pay principal and interest on the securities issued by the
-SPY.
Predictability of payment is affected by the nature and identity of
both the obligors on the receivables and the originator, and also by
the nature of the receivables themselves. From the standpoint of the
obligors, there are two risks: delay in payment (sometimes referred to
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as "slow pay"), and default in payment (sometimes referred to as "no
pay").
The "slow pay" risk is that the obligors on the receivables may
delay in making their payments. A holder of securities issued by the
SPY would not be pleased to learn that his monthly or quarterly interest payment was not made because an obligor delayed his payment.
For this reason, the number of obligors on the receivables should be
large enough to maintain statistical assurance that, even if a reasonably expected number of obligors delay in making their payments, the
securities issued by the Spy will be paid on time. 3
The "no pay" risk is that the obligors on the receivables may
default in making their payments. This risk in tum depends upon
several factors. The obvious factor is the financial ability of the obligors to pay the receivables: an obligor might not pay because it is
bankrupt or otherwise having financial problems .. An obligor also
may have a defense to payment. 4 Therefore, the number of obligors
on the receivables again must be large enough so that the risk of default can be statistically determined.
There are, however, certain factors that can impair the validity of
a statistical analysis. It may be that a relatively small number of the
obligors (counting, for this purpose, affiliated obligors ~s a single obligor, because default by any given obligor may signify financial trouble
for the affiliates of that obligor) account for a disproportionately large
amount of payments under the receivables. Default by these obligors
might impair the ability of the securityholders to be repaid. This risk
of high concentrations of payments by a relatively small number of
obligors is called, naturally enough, the obligor concentration risk.
The default risk therefore can be managed by the SPY buying
receivables having a statistically large number of obligors, and by analyzing the obligor concentrations. The financial ability of the obligors
to pay, and the possibility that the obligors may be able to assert defenses to payment, also would be considered. The default risk then
may be addressed by the originator's adjusting the sale price of the
receivables to take into account anticipated defaults. 5 Alternatively,
3 Even payment streams that are uncertain as to precise timing of collections may be able
to be securitized if a credit facility (referred to as a liquidity facility) is provided to advance
funds to the SPY to pay debt service if collections are temporarily delayed. While the security
holders obtain comfort as to timing of collection, a liquidity facility does not necessarily protect the security holders in the case of larger than anticipated defaults.
4 The rights of a transferee of receivables may be subject to obligor defenses. See V.C.C.
§ 9-318(1) (1989).
5 There are various ways to compute the purchase price. The most straightforward is to
discount the outstanding balance of the receivables to be purchased. taking into account antici-
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or in addition, the default risk may be addressed by credit enhancement. This can take various forms, such as a guaranty, a letter of
credit, an irrevocable credit line, or third party purchasing a tranche
of subordinated securities from the SPV. 6 The goal is that a
creditworthy third party assures payment of all or a portion of the
securities issued by the SPV.7
Predictability of payment also depends on the nature and identity
of the originator. A financially troubled originator is more likely to
go bankrupt, thereby raising the question whether the transfer of its
receivables is a sale for bankruptcy purposes. If a court holds the
transfer not to be a sale, the ability of the SPY to receive collections
on the receivables will be delayed and may be seriously impaired.
This is discussed in greater detail in Part IV(B).
Finally, predictability of payment may depend on the nature of
the receivables themselves. For example, where the receivables constitute obligations owing for goods sold or services rendered (the standard trade receivables), there are few defenses to payment. Perhaps
some of the goods sold will tum out to be defective, or some of the
obligors will tum out to be minors. But in general a buyer of the
receivables can anti~ipate the delinquency and default risks based on
past collection patterns.
This type of predictability may not be obtained if the receivables
represent payment for future performance obligations of the originator. A good ~xample is franchise fees. These are amounts payable
pated defaults and delays in collection. If the discount is too small, however, the SPV's securityholders could suffer a loss. But if the discount is too large, the originator would be underpricing its receivables. Sometimes the discount is intentionally small, but the SPV has a degree
of additional recourse (a "loss reserve") against the originator or against additional receivables.
Other times the discount is intentionally large (sometimes referred to as "overcollateralization"), but the originator retains a right to certain excess collections if the actual defaults do
not turn out to justify the large discount (payment of a "holdback"). The purchase price also
could represent a small discount, with the originator absorbing a portion of the risk by
purchasing a tranche of subordinated securities from the SPV. These are merely examples.
The method of pricing that is selected will depend on business and credit considerations that
are beyond the scope of this article. It should be noted, however, that the more straightforward the method of pricing, and the more the SPV bears some risk ofioss, the more likely it is
that the sale of receivables will be considered a true sale for bankruptcy purposes. See discussion in Part IV(B)(I) below.
6 See generally Schwarcz & Varges, Guaranties and Other Third Party Credit Supports, in
Commercial Loan Documentation Guide (1989).
7 A rating agency that rates the SPY's securities would want the third party to be at least
-as creditworthy as the rating on the securities. The third party providing the credit support
would want to be comfortable, as a business matter, with the ability to be repaid from the
originator or its assets. If the third party has a claim for repayment that is enforceable against
the originator or its general assets (as opposed, for example; to a subrogation claim limited to
the receivables sold), the transaction may appe~r to provide a form of indirect recourse against
the originator. Cf. supra note 5 and Part IY(B)(I).
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from obligors, called franchisees, to a franchisor (the originator) in
return for the license to run a business using a special tradename or
trademark and selling designated products or services. 8
Franchise fees may not be payment obligations at all but merely
expectations of payment. These fees may be calculated, for example,
by a percentage (or other formula) of the franchisee's monthly or
other periodic revenues or profits. If there are no revenues or profits,
no franchise fee is payable. Also, if the franchisor (orig~nator) fails to
perform the contractually agreed upon franchise services, the franchisee may have a legal defense against payment of franchise fees.
In addition, in the case of bankruptcy of the originator, the originator (or its trustee in bankruptcy) may have the right, under section
365 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code,9 to reject, or terminate, the
franchise agreement as an executory contract. An executory contract
is any contract where substantial performance remains due on both
sides, such that breach by one party of its performance obligations
would excuse the other side's obligation to perform. \0 A franc~ise
agreement may well be this type of a contract. lI Accordingly, an
originator that becomes the subject of a bankruptcy case may be able
to terminate the contract if it has business reasons to do SO.12
The rejection of an executory contract by an originator in bankruptcy would subject the originator to a claim for damages for breach
of contract. This damage claim, however, has no priority and ranks
on a parity with the originator's general unsecured claims. Presumably the claim would be worth less (perhaps far less) than 100 cents on
8 See, e.g., Black's Law Dictionary 592 (5th ed. 1979) (definition of franchise). It is typical for franchise agreements, and indeed many other types of long-term contracts, to contain
prohibitions on assignment. This should not, however, prohibit the assignment of the right to
payments made thereunder. Even if the contract purports to prohibit the assignment of rights
thereunder, such prohibition should be ineffective as a matter of law in most cases. See V.C.C.
§ 9-318(4) (1989) and Official Comment No.4 thereunder.
9 II U.S.c. § 365 (1988).
\0 See H. R. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., at 347 (1977); In re Streets & Beard Farm
Partnership, 882 F.2d 233 (7th Cir. 1989); In re Grayson-Robinson Stores, Inc., 321 F.2d 500
(2d Cir. 1963); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy ~~ 365-01, 365-02, 365-05, 365-06, 365-08 (15th ed.
1989).
11 See, e.g., Rosenthal Paper Co. v. National Folding Box & Paper Co., 226 N.Y. 313,123
N.E. 766 (1919); Isquith v. New York State Thruway Auth., 27 Misc. 2d 539, 542, 215
N.Y.S.2d 393, 397 (N.Y.Ct. Cl. 1961) (thruway toll ticket as executory contract); Gerry v.
Johnston, 85 Idaho 226,378 P.2d 198 (1963). Many contracts have been held to be executory,
even where the performance obligation has not been obvious. For example, a lease has been
held to be an executory contract because of the lessor's obligation not to interfere with the
lessee's right of quiet enjoyment. See, e.g., In re O.P.M. Leasing Servs., Inc., 23 Bankr. 104,
117 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982).
12 For example, the franchisor may be unable to provide the products or perform the training or other services, if any, required under the franchise contract.
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the dollar. \3
The foregoing analysis of risks was illustrated by reference to a
payment stream represented by a franchise contract. The same legal
conclusions would obtain, however, for other types of future payment
streams-such as leases, licenses, etc.-where a contract breach by
the originator could raise a defense to payment by the obligors; or
where the contract is an executory contract. 14
IV.

SEPARATING THE SOURCE OF PAYMENT
FROM THE ORIGINATOR

We have previously discussed the "source" of payment. The
source of payment must be separated from the originator in the event
the originator becomes troubled or bankrupt. It is therefore necessary, first, to ensure that whatever happens to the originator cannot
affect the SPY (often referred to as making the Spy "bankruptcy remote") and, second, to ensure that the transfer of the receivables from
the originator to the Spy cannot be interfered with (often referred to
as creating a "true sale" of the receivables).
A.

Making the SPV "Bankruptcy Remote"

The SPY itself must be insulated, to the extent practicable, from
a possible bankruptcy of the originator. There are several ways the
13 See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 365(g). There is a further question that could arise in
bankruptcy. Section 552(a) of the Bankruptcy Code provides, in part, that property acquired
by a company after the commencement of a bankruptcy case is not subject to a lien resulting
from a pre-bankruptcy security agreement. II U.S.C. § 552(a). Section 552(b) provides that
proceeds of pre-bankruptcy property may be exempt from this restriction. 11 U.S.c. § 552(b).
Where the SPV pays for a future payment stream, such as lease rentals, would the SPV be
entitled to rentals paid after the originator goes bankrupt? At least one court has said yes. In
United Virginia Bank v. Slab Fork Coal Co. (In re Slab Fork Coal Co.), 784 F.2d 1188 (4th
Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 905 (1986), the court held that payments made post-bankruptcy under a coal supply contract were proceeds subject to a pre-bankruptcy lien, even
where the bankrupt company would have to continue to supply the coal in order to be paid.
Id. at 1190-91 (following In re Sunberg, 729 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1984». Because § 552(b)
allows a court to weigh the equities of each case, however, there is no assurance that a similar
result will obtain in each case. See, e.g., In re Colonial Realty Investment Co., 516 F.2d 154
(1st Cir. 1975); In re Photo Promotion Associates, Inc., 61 Bankr. 936, 939-40 (Bankr.
S.D. N.Y. 1986) (bankruptcy courts have considerable latitude under § 522(b».
14 The nature of the receivable also can affect predictability of payment where the receivable is prepayable. If, for example, the receivables consisted of mortgage loans, and interest
rates declined, the obligors might prepay the loans. Although the collections should then be
sufficient to prepay the principal amount of the debt securities issued by the SPV, the holders
of these securities may have bargained to have their securities outstanding for a longer period
of time at a fixed interest rate. The problems associated with prepayments are beyond the
scope of this article.
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originator's bankruptcy could affect the SPY, and each must be protected against.
If the Spy is owned or controlled by the originator, 15 the originator may have the power to cause the SPY to file a voluntary petition
for bankruptcy under section 303 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code. 16
There are no legal standards that must be met for a voluntary petition
to be filed. 17 It is therefore important to limit, by design, the ability of
the originator to cause the SPY to file a voluntary bankruptcy.18
This limitation normally is accomplished by drafting the SPY's
charter or articles of incorporation or other organizational documents
to restrict the circumstances under which it may' place itself in voluntary bankruptcy. Charters of SPVs sometimes provide that the Spy
may not place itself into bankruptcy unless the SPY is insolvent and a
requisite percentage of independent board members votes for bankruptcy. Some SPVs are organized with at least two classes of stock;
and both classes must vote affirmatively for bankruptcy in order for
the SPY to file a voluntary petition. One class of stock then is pledged
to, or otherwise controlled by, the holders of the Spy's securities. 19
These methods are not infallible. Whether they are enforceable
will depend upon the law of the particular jurisdiction of the SPY's
15
16
17

Sometimes, for example, the SPY is a limited purpose subsidiary of the originator.
11 U.S.c. § 303 (1988).
The Federal Bankruptcy Code does not require any special procedures for a company to
file a voluntary bankruptcy petition. A company would make this decision like any other
significant decision. Unless restricted in its charter or bylaws, a corporation, for example,
normally would make this decision by a vote of its board of directors.
18 It appears to be against public policy to remove entirely a company's' power to place
itself in voluntary bankruptcy. Cf. Fallick v. Kehr, 369 F.2d 899, 904-05 (2d Cir. 1966); In re
Tru Block Concrete Prods., Inc., 27 Bankr. 486, 492 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1983) (prepetition
agreement to avoid bankruptcy proceedings void as against public policy); In re Weitzen, 3 F.
Supp. 698, 698-99 (S.D. N.Y. 1933) (agreement to waive benefits of bankruptcy unenforceable).
19 If the holders of the SPY's securities control, by pledge or otherwise, a class of the SPY's
voting stock, there is a question whether these holders may be exposed to liability claims for
"controlling" the SPY. See, e.g., In re Sea-Land Corporation Shareholders Litigation, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ~ 93,923 (Del. Ch. 1988); Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815-17 (Del.
1984); Gilbert v. EI Paso Co., 490 A.2d 1050 (Del. Ch. 1984) for a discussion by the Delaware
courts of what constitutes shareholder control and the type of liability which might accompany such control. Related to this is the issue of whether the holders of the SPY's securities
may vote against a bankruptcy proceeding for the SPY when such proceeding might be in the
best interests of the equity owner of the Spy (i.e., the originator). Courts have held that when
a creditor is able to exercise control of a corporation by voting pledged securities, it has a duty
to use reasonable care to maintain the value of the collateral. See, e.g., Citibank, N.A. v. Data
Lease Fin. Corp., 828 F.2d 686, 694 (11th Cir. 1987); cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1019 (1988);
Empire Life Ins. Co. of Am. v. Valdak Corp., 468 F.2d 330, 335 (5th Cir. 1972). But the
creditor nonetheless has the right to protect its legitimate self-interest and need not fall back
upon its debtor's recommendations in order to satisfy the duty of reasonable care. Bankers
Trust Co. v. J.V. Dowler & Co., 47 N.Y.2d 128, 390 N.E.2d 766, 417 N.Y.S.2d 47 (1979).
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formation. Delaware law presently appears to offer flexibility in
approaches. 20
Another approach is for the Spy to be neither owned nor controlled by the originator. The Spy may, for example, be owned by an
independent third party, such as a charitable institution. If the Spy
continued to collect the receivables and pay on its securities even after
the originator went bankrupt, the charity (or other third party) would
have no incentive to place the SPY in bankruptcy. The SPY also
could be structured as an entity that cannot become the subject of a
federal bankruptcy case. One such entity is a trust, although "business trusts"21 may be the subject of federal bankruptcy cases. 22
Once the SPY's power to file a voluntary bankruptcy petition is
restricted, the next step is to limit the circumstances under which
creditors can force the Spy into involuntary bankruptcy. Unlike voluntary bankruptcy, a creditor may not force an Spy into involuntary.
bankruptcy unless the Spy meets the criteria required for filing. 23
These criteria are that the Spy is either generally not paying its debts
as they become due, or that a custodian, other than a trustee, receiver,
or agent, appointed or authorized to take charge of less than substantially all of the property of the Spy for the purpose of enforcing a lien
against such property, has been appointed or has taken possession. 24
One therefore may attempt to protect against involuntary bankruptcy
by limiting both the debt that the SPY can issue and the number of
trade creditors. (The number of trade creditors can be effectively limited by limiting the business in which the SPY can engage.) These
limitations could be included, for example, in the SPY's charter or
other organizational documents. Furthermore, any third parties that
deal with the SPY contractually could be required to waive their respective rights to file an involuntary bankruptcy petition against the
SPY.
20 See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8 §§ 102(b)(I), 121 (1988). If a majority of the voting
shares of the spy is owned by the originator, the SPV and the originator may have to be
consolidated for accounting purposes. See Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
94.
21 A business trust is a trust that carries on a business for profit, as opposed to a nonbusiness trust which is created to hold and preserve the trust property. See Hecht v. Malley,
265 U.S. 144, 159-62 (1924); W. Fletcher, 16A Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Private
Corporations § 8267 (D. Nelson & M. Wasiunec rev. ed. 1988).
22 See Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.c. § 101(8)(A)(v) (1988). If the originator is an entity,
such as a bank, that cannot become the subject of a federal bankruptcy case, the requirements
for an Spy may be more lenient. See Bankrupcy Code, II U.S.c. § 109 (1988).
23 Section 303(b) of the Bankruptcy Code also has requirements for the number of creditors and the types of claims necessary for filing an involuntary petition. II U.S.C. § 303(b)
(1988).
24 See Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.c. § 303(h).
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Eliminating creditors does not guaranty that the SPY will be protected from the originator's bankruptcy. An equitable doctrine of
law, known as substantive consolidation, may allow a court under appropriate circumstances to consolidate the assets and liabilities of the
originator and the SPY. Although substantive consolidation usually
arises in the context of a bankruptcy both of the originator and the
SPY, a court could order a substantive consolidation even where the
Spy is not in bankruptcy, or, in the alternative, place restrictions on
the operations of the SPY notwithstanding that the SPY is not in
bankruptcy.25
Courts do not order substantive consolidation lightly. The determination that two entities should be substantively consolidated must
be made on a case-by-case basis, after consideration of the relevant
facts of each case. Courts will take into consideration both the nature
of the relationship between the entities to be consolidated and the effect of the consolidation on the creditors of each entity. Among the
factors to be considered for this purpose, the courts have identified the
following:
1. the degree of difficulty in segregating and ascertaining individual liabilities and assets;
2. the presence or absence of consolidated financial statements;
3. the commingling of assets and business functions;
4. the unity of ownership and interests between the corporate
entities;
5. the guaranteeing by the parent of loans of the subsidiary; and
6. the transfer of assets without formal observance of corporate
formalities. 26

The presence of some or even many of these factors does not,
however, necessarily mean that a court will order a substantive consolidation. Recently, courts have held that because substantive consolidation is an equitable remedy, it should not be used to harm
innocent holders of securities of the company (in our case, the SPY)
that is the target of consolidation. 27
It therefore would not appear likely that a court would substan25 See, e.g., Sampsell v. Imperial Paper & Color Corp., 313 U.S. 215 (1941) (consolidating
the assets of corporation with those of its stockholders); 5 Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 1100.06
[3], at 1100-44 to 1100-46 (15th ed. 1989).
26 In re Vecco Constr. Indus., 4 Bankr. 407, 410 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1980); see discussion in
5 Collier on Bankruptcy ~ 1100.06 [3] (15th ed., 1989); Chemical Bank New York Trust Co.
v. Kheel (In re Seatrade Corp.), 369 F.2d 845, 847 (2d Cir. 1966); In re Manzey Land & Cattle
Co., 17 Bankr. 332, 338 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982).
27 See, e.g., In re Augie/Restivo Baking Co., 860 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1988) (denying consolidation where one creditor would suffer unfairly); In re Snider Bros., Inc., 18 Bankr. 230, 239
(Bankr. D. Mass. 1982) (court's power arises out of equity and should be used sparingly).
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tively consolidate the assets and liabilities of an Spy and a bankrupt
originator in a typical transaction. Nonetheless, substantive consolidation is an equitable remedy and is highly dependent on the facts.
The foregoing discussion has focused on limiting the circumstances under which the SPY, or its assets, could become subject to a
federal bankruptcy case. Certain types of governmental claims, however, that arise against the originator may also be asserted against the
SPY, regardless of whether the SPY is in bankruptcy. Under the
United States Internal Revenue Code, for example,a cl~im can be
asserted against any member of a consolidated tax group.28 If the
SPY is a member of the originator's consolidated tax' group, as would
be likely if the SPY is a subsidiary of the originator, the Internal Revenue Service would be able to assert a claim that it has against the
originator directly against the SPY.29
Another type of governmental claim that may be asserted in this
way is a pension claim. Certain governmental claims relating to defined benefit pension plans can be asserted under the Internal Revenue
Code and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
(ERISA),30 as amended, against any trade or business under common
control with the sponsor of the plan (a "controlled group").3! For
example, if there are unfunded benefits payable upon the termination
of a defined benefit pension plan, the sponsoring employer and each
member of its controlled group, which could include the SPY, would
be liable to the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the
agency responsible for administering the ERISA plan termination
rules, for 100% of the unfunded benefits.32 In addition, the PBGC
has a lien for its claim against the property of each member of the
28
29

I.R.C. § 1502 (1988).
Treas. Reg. § 1.1502-6 states that the common parent corporation and each subsidiary
that was a member of the group during any part of the consolidated return year shall be
severally liable for the tax for such year unless the subsidiary has ceased to be a part of the
group as the result of a bona fide sale or exchange for fair value prior to the date upon which
the deficiency was assessed, in which case such liability may be limited. No agreement entered
into by one or more members of the group with any other member or other person can eliminate or reduce this liability. 26 C.F.R. § 1.1502-6 (1989).
30 Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829 (codified as amended in various sections of 26 U.S.C.
(1988) and 29 U.S.c. (1982 & Supp. V 1987».
31 In general, a controlled group includes parent-subsidiary and brother-sister groups that
are under 80% common ownership, and therefore may include an 80% owned SPV. 1.R.c.
§ 414(b), (c) (1988); Treas. Reg. § 1.414(b), (c), 26 C.F.R. §§ 1 & 602, 53 F.R. 6603 (1989);
ERISA § 4OO1(b), Pub. L. No. 93-406, 88 Stat. 829, 1004 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 401 (1982».
32 ERISA § 4062(a), (b), 88 Stat. 829, 1029 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. § 1362 (a),
(b) (1982 & Supp. V 1987».
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group, up to 30% of the collective net worth of the group.33 The lien
generally has the same status as a tax lien. 34 In addition, liability for
unpaid contributions to an ongoing defined benefit pension plan extends to all members of the controlled group, and a lien on their property (with the same status as a tax lien) will be imposed in favor of the
PBGC if the unpaid contributions exceed a certain level. 35 These governmental claims normally would have priority to claims of general
securityholders.
It is possible, however, for the claims of holders of securities of
the Spy to gain priority over governmental claims by the SPY's
pledging its receivables to secure repayment of the securityholders.
Such a pledge would come ahead of the governmental claims in most
instances. 36

B.

Creating a "True Sale" of the Receivables

Having accomplished a separation of the originator and the SPY,
it is important to ensure that ownership of the receivables is effectively transferred to the SPY. This transfer is typically referred to as
33 ERISA § 4068(a), 88 Stat. 829, 1032 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.c. § 1368 (a)
(Supp. V 1987». The PBGC generally has great latitude in determining net worth, and ERISA was recently amended to specifically provide that negative net worths of group members
are not offset against positive net worths for these purposes. 29 U.S.c. § 1362(d)(I) (Supp. V
1987».
34 ERISA § 4068(c), 88 Stat. 829, 1032-33 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.c. § 6323
(1982».
35 I.R.C. § 412(c)(1I), (n); ERISA § 302(c), 88 Stat. 829, 871 (codified as amended at 29
U.S.C. § 1082(f)(3) (Supp. v 1987».
36 See, e.g., In re National Fin. Alternatives, Inc., 96 Bankr. 844, 853-54 (Bankr. N.D. III.
1989) (holding that receivables acquired by the debtor after a tax lien filed by the IRS had
become effective were nevertheless "qualified property," i.e., property covered by the creditor's
prior security interest, so long as they were the identifiable proceeds of a contract right acquired prior to the effective date of the tax lien and had not been commingled with other
monies or expended to acquire other properties after that date). Cf. U.C.c. §§ 9-301(4), 9-312
(1989).
Another issue that should be considered in connection with the establishment of the SPV
is the extent to which it may be subject to income tax. Although a detailed discussion of tax
issues is beyond the scope of this Article, a few key points should be noted. If the SPV is a
corporation wholly-owned by a corporate originato'r, then it can be consolidated with the originator, at least for federal income tax purposes, eliminating a separate tax at the SPV level. (It
mayor may not, however, be possible to consolidate or combine for state or local income tax
purposes.) Similarly, if the SPV is a trust with respect to which the originator retains a sufficient economic interest or control such that the SPV is treated as a so-called grantor-trust,
there will be no tax at the SPV level, and any income of the SPV would simply be passed
through to the originator, as grantor. Alternatively, it may be possible to structure an SPV
that is a trust in such a way as to assure that it will be treated as a partnership, in which case it
also would generally not be subject to a separate level of tax. In other cases the SPV may be
subject to tax in its own right; it may in fact have little taxable income, however, because of
offsetting deductions for interest paid on debt securities issued by it.
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a "true sale." The term "true sale" is misleading, however, because a
given transfer of receivables may well be a sale for certain purposes
but not others. For example, the criteria for establishing an accounting sale under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), governed by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 77 (FAS
77), are less stringent37 than the criteria for establishing a sale under
bankruptcy law.
The originator transferring its receivables to the Spy presumably
would want the transfer to constitute a sale for accounting purposes.
That way the financing is reflected on its balance sheet as a sale of
assets and not as a secured loan (which would increase leverage). The
originator also may want the transfer to be a sale for purposes of its
indenture covenants, if such covenants restrict the originator's ability
to incur debt or pledge its assets. In many cases, particularly where
the indenture itself states that its interpretation is to be governed by
GAAP, it may well be the case that a transfer which is an accounting
sale also will be viewed as a sale under the indenture. 38 Whether a
given transfer of receivables violates one or more indenture or other
contractual covenants, however, is a legal question that turns closely
on the precise contractual language and usually would be best interpreted by the originator's own counsel.
The term "true sale" most often is used in analyzing whether the
transfer of receivables effectively has remov~d the receivables from the
originator for bankruptcy purposes. If the originator goes bankrupt
and the receivables are no longer owned by the originator but instead
are owned by the SPY, then the SPY would own the collections on the
receivables. Assuming the receivables were paid, the Spy then would
have sufficient cash to pay its securities without defaulting. But if the
transfer is held not to be a sale for bankruptcy purposes, it will be
37 On February 23, 1989, at a meeting of the Financial Accounting Standard Board's
Emerging Issues Task Force (EITF), the SEC observer ·stated that the SEC is becoming increasingly concerned about certain receivables, leasing and other transactions involving special
purpose vehicles. The SEC observer suggested, for the EITF's consideration, certain requirements that the SEC felt should be met in order for the transfers of receivables to be recognized
as sales and to avoid consolidation of the SPY and the originator of the receivables. These
requirements included that the majority owner of the SPV be an independent third party who
has made a substantive capital investment in the SPV, has control of the SPV, and has substantive risks and rewards of ownership of the receivables or other assets purchased by the SPY
(including residuals). Although the SEC staff is said to be considering the issuance of a Staff
Accounting Bulletin setting forth guidelines on the accounting for transactions involving
SPYs, no such Bulletin has yet been issued. See EITF Abstracts, Issue No. 84-30.
38 For example, the indenture covenant may restrict liens securing debt, although the term
"debt" may not be defined in the indenture. Indentures often state that accounting terms used
therein are to be construed in accordance with GAAP. A court therefore may use the GAAP
definition of "debt," which is governed by FAS 77.
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deemed an advance of funds by the SPY to the originator secured by
the receivables. 39 The SPY would have a security interest, but not an
ownership interest, in the receivables. In such a case, the originator's
bankruptcy would, under section 362 of the Federal Bankruptcy
Code,4O automatically result in a stay of all actions by creditors to
foreclose on or otherwise obtain property of the originator. 41
If the transfer of the receivables from the originator to the SPY is
recharacterized by the bankruptcy court as a secured loan rather than
as a sale, the Spy may not be able to obtain payments collected on the
receivables until the stay is modified. Furthermore, under section 363
of the Federal Bankruptcy Code,42 a court, after notice to creditors
and the opportunity of a hearing, could order the cash collections of
the receivables to be used by the originator in its business as working
capital if adequate protection of the interest of the Spy in the receivables is provided by the originator or its trustee. 43
In addition, section 364 of the Federal Bankruptcy Code44 also
would permit the originator, if credit is not otherwise available to it
and if adequate protection is given to the Spy, to raise cash by granting to new lenders a lien that is either pari passu with that of the Spy
or, if a pari passu lien cannot attract new financing, having priority
over the Spy's lien. 45
39 See P. Weil, Asset-Based Lending: An Introductory Guide to Secured Financing 195
(1989).
A related issue is whether a true sale of receivables can be avoided as a "fraudulent conveyance" if the SPY pays a purchase price that is less than the reasonably equivalent value of
the receivables. This risk is minimal, however, in the typical structured financing because the
purchase price for the receivables normally will be determined on an arm's length basis
(although the fairness of the purchase price may be subject to greater scrutiny if the originator
is a troubled company). For a discussion of fraudulent conveyance laws, see Schwarcz, The
Impact of Fraudulent Conveyance Law on Future Advances Supported by Upstream Guaranties and Security Interests, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 729 (1987).
40 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1988).
41 Section 362(d) provides criteria for the judge to determine whether to lift the stay.
Whether the stay will be lifted depends on the facts of the given case. See, e.g., In re Comcoach Corp., 698 F.2d 571, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1983); In re Sweetwater, 11 Bankr. Ct. Dec. (CRR)
1220, 1227 (Bankr. D. Utah 1984), aff'd, 57 Bankr. 748 (D. Utah 1985).
42 11 U.S.C. § 363.
43 Adequate protection is not defined in the Federal Bankruptcy Code. Instead, the Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C. § 361, gives several examples of what may constitute adequate protection, such as making periodic cash payments to the creditor (§ 361(1» or giving a lien on other
unencumbered property in the debtor's estate (§ 361(2», and leaves it for the courts to decide
on a case by case basis what constitutes "adequate protection" in the circumstances. See, e.g.,
In re AIC Indus., 83 Bankr. 774, 777 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1988) ("adequate protection" pursuant
to § 363); In re O.P. Held, Inc., 74 Bankr. 777, 782-84 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. 1987).
For a thorough discussion of the issue of "adequate protection," see In re Timbers of
Inwood Forest Assoc., 808 F.2d 363 (5th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 484 U.S. 365 (1989).
44 11 U.S.c. § 364.
45 Bankruptcy Code § 364(d)(I) provides as follows:
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Although various courts have considered whether a given transfer of receivables constitutes a sale or a secured loan for bankruptcy
purposes, the facts of the decided cases have not been representative
for the most part of modern asset securitized transactions. Accordingly, the cases are not easily harmonized, and different readers may
argue as to which factors are relevant and which are entitled to
greater weight. Nonetheless, a cluster of factors can be identified that
are relevant in most determinations of whether a given receivables
transfer is a sale or a secured loan.46
1.

Recourse

The most significant factor appears to be the extent of recourse
the transferee of the receivables has against the transferor. As the
degree of recourse increases, the likelihood that a cohrt will find a true
sale decreases. The existence of some recourse does not by itself preclude characterization of the transaction as a true sale. If recourse is
present, the issue is "whether the nature of the recourse, and the true
nature of the transaction, are such that the legal rights and economic
consequences of the agreement bear a greater similarity to a financing
transaction [that is, a secured loan] or to a sale."47
Sometimes the seller represents and warrants that all receivables
sold meet certain eligibility criteria, and the seller will provide an indemnity for breach of these representations and warranties. To the
extent these representations and warranties are not general representations and warranties of collectibility, but rather are limited to the
condition of the receivables at the time the receivables are sold, this
The court, after notice and a hearing, may authorize the obtaining of credit or the
incurring of debt secured by a senior or equal lien on property of the estate that is
subject to a lien only if (A) the trustee is unable to obtain such credit otherwise; and
(B) there is adequate protection of the interest of the holder of the lien on the
property of the estate on which such senior or equal lien is proposed to be
granted.
II u.s.c. § 364(d)(I).
In practice, it is common for a secured lender in bankruptcy to work out an arrangement,
approved by the court after notice and a hearing, whereby the lender in effect re-advances the
cash collections it receives as new post-petition loans secured by future receivables of the company. For a discussion of these arrangements, see Schochet & Murphy, Financing the DebtorIn-Possession: Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, 448 PU/Comm. 445 (1988); Schochet,
Murphy & Germain, Post Petition Financing: Section 364 of the Bankruptcy Code, 487 PUI
Comm. 213 (1989).
46 Each of these factors is indicative of whether the originator truly has parted with the
future economic risks and benefits of ownership of the receivables purported to be sold, and
whether the SPV has taken on these risks and benefits.
47 Major's Furniture Mart, Inc. v. Castle Credit Corp., 602 F.2d 538, 544 (3d Cir. 1979)
(emphasis in original; footnotes omitted).
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should be no different from a warranty ordinarily given by a seller of a
product.48 Accordingly, such limited representations and warranties
and indemnity should not be inconsistent with sale treatment.
2.

Retained Rights and Right to Surplus

Perhaps the second most important factor indicating a secured
transaction is the transferor's right to redeem or repurchase transferred receivables. For example, section 9-506 of the vee and various state mortgage statutes49 allow a debtor to redeem property before
it is ultimately disposed of by a secured party. The absence of a right
of redemption or repurchase would be a factor in favor of characterization of the receivables transaction as a true sale.
Several courts also have considered the existence of a transferor's
right to any surplus collections, once the transferee has collected its
investment plus an agreed yield, as indicative of a secured loan. 50 The
right of the transferee of the receivables to retain all collections of
transferred receivables for its own account, even after the transferee
has collected its investment plus yield, would therefore be a factor in
favor of characterization of the receivables transaction as a true sale.

3.

Pricing Mechanism

Pricing based upon a fluctuating interest index of the type found
in commercial loan agreements, such as the prime or base rate, may
be indicative of a secured loan. The pricing mechanism also may be
indicative of a secured loan to the extent the purchase price is retroactively adjusted to reflect actual rather than ~xpected collections on
receivables. 51
In the closest approach to a true sale, the SPV would purchase
receivables at a discount calculated to cover the SPV's funding cost
(as well as risk of loss). The discount would be fixed for ea,ch sale,
See U.C.C. §§ 2-312, 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (1989).
See, e.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 9-506 (Supp. 1988).
50 See, e.g., In re Evergreen Valley Resort, Inc., 23 Bankr. 659, 661-62 (Bankr. D. Me.
1982); In re Hurricane Elkhorn Coal Corp., 19 Bankr. 609, 617 (Bankr.:W.D. Ky. 1982); In re
Nixon Machinery Co., 6 Bankr. 847, 854 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1980).
51 See Home Bond Co. v. McChesney, 239 u.s. 568 (1916); Dorothy v. Commonwealth
Commercial Co., 278 Ill. 629, 116 N.E. 143 (1917). A conservative approach would be for
purchases to be made on a discounted basis. The discount could be negotiated p.rior to each
purchase, in part based on the purchaser's then net current cost of funds and the anticipated
collection experience of the receivables then to be purchased. Once a discount has been negotiated for each purchase, it would not thereafter be modified or otherwise adjusted for that
purchase, irrespective of differences between the actual versus anticipated cost of funds and
collection experience. Such pricing would be a factor in favor of characterization of the receivables transaction as a true sale.
48

49
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and would not be retroactively adjusted to cover the actual funding
cost.
4.

Administration and Collection of Accounts

The administration of and control over the collection of accounts
receivable are factors sometimes cited by courts in resolving the sale/
secured loan issue. 52 To be a true purchase, the transferee should
have the authority to control the collection of the accounts. 53 Examples of such authority would include (1) ownership by the transferee
of all the books, records and computer tapes relating to the purchased
receivables, and (2) the transferee's having the right to (a) control the
activities of any collection agent with respect to purchased receivables
and at any time to appoint itself or another person as collection agent,
(b) establish credit and collection policy with respect to purchased
receivables, and (c) at any time notify the obligors of the purchased
receivables of the sale.
In practice, the seller often is appointed as the collection agent
initially. This is not necessarily inconsistent with sale characterization if (1) the seller, as collection agent, will be acting as an agent for
the purchaser pursuant to established standards, much like any other
agent, (2) the seller will receive a collection agent fee that represents
an arm's length fee for these services, and (3) the purchaser has the
right at any time to appoint itself or another person as collection
agent in place of the seller.
Sometimes collections of the purchased receivables are paid to
the originator and commingled, or mixed, with the originator's general funds. This frequently occurs where the originator collects the
receivables each day, but only remits the collections periodically (such
as monthly) to the SPY. Besides raising a potential perfection question under the vee,54 commingling' would, if permitted by the SPY,
appear to be inconsistent with the concept of a sale: the originator
would be using collections that belong to the SPY. This inconsistency
often can be addressed by the originator's segregating and holding the
collections in trust, pending remittance to the SPY. 55
52 One interesting discussion of this question occurs in the British case, Lloyds & Scottish
Finance Ltd. v. Cyril Lord Carpets Sales Ltd., House of Lords, 29 March 1979 (transcript
available on LEXIS).
S3 People v. Service Inst., Inc., 101 Misc. 2d 325, 421 N.Y.S.2d 325 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979).
54 See text accompanying footnotes 58-69.
ss Alternatively, the SPV may be able to lend proceeds to the originator, although this
approach has limited precedent.
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Additional Factors

The courts have identified a variety of other factors that do not
fall within the categories discussed above but which may be indicative
of a secured loan. 56 . Among the more significant of these factors are
the following:
(a) the originator of receivables is a debtor of the SPY on or
before the purchase date;
(b) the SPY's rights in the receivables can be extinguished by
payments or repurchases by the originator or by payments from
sources other than collections on receivables;
(c) the originator is obligated to pay the SPY's costs (including
attorneys' fees) incurred in collecting delinquent or uncollectible
receivables;
(d) the language of the documentation contains references to
the transfer being "security for" a debt; and·
(e) the parties' intent, as evidenced by the documentation and
their actions, suggests that the parties view the transaction as a security device. Also of importance is how the parties account for the
transaction on their books, records, and tax returns.
It is rare in modern commercial transactions for all the factors
favoring a true bankruptcy sale to be met. There is inevitably a balance. Some recourse is needed to give a reasonable assurance to holders of the SPY's securities that they will be paid. It may be
uneconomic for an originator to agree that the Spy obtains the entire
surplus of collections once holders of the SPY's securities are paid. In
each case the parties structuring the transaction will have to balance
how important it is that the transaction be a bankruptcy sale with the
other commercial desires of the investors and the originator. This
balance will depend, in large part, on the credit quality of the originator. It may be less important to investors to insist on a true sale where
the originator has an investment grade rating than where the originator is troubled or in a workout. 57
C.

Additional Steps Required Under the UCC
to Protect the Transfer

Once the SPY has been created and the transaction structured, it
See P. Weil, supra note 39, at 23-37.
A company sometimes may require that the receivables transfer be a loan for tax purposes so as, for example, to avoid recognition of a taxable gain that would be triggered if the
transfer is treated as a tax sale. Because the bankruptcy and tax sale criteria, although not
identical, are similar-and the bankruptcy cases may apply even closer scrutiny than the
IRS-structuring a receivables transfer as a bankruptcy sale may well make it also a tax sale.
56
57
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still will be necessary to take certain steps to protect the transfer of
receivables against claims of third parties and in bankruptcy. The
Vniform Commercial Code (VCC), adopted (with only minor variation) in every state of the Vnited States,58 provides in section 9-102
that each transfer of an interest in "accounts" and "chattel paper,"
whether or not intended as a transfer for security or a transfer of actual ownership, must be perfected by one of the procedures set forth
in the VCC (usually accomplished by the filing of VCC-l financing
statements). 59 The commentary to this section (Official Comment
No.2) explains that the draftsmen had difficulty trying to set guidelines on whether a given transfer was a sale or a secured loan, and
therefore established the same filing requirement in both cases. The
purpose of the filing is to place third parties on notice of the transfer
of the interest in the receivables, so they will not be misled when extending credit to or otherwise dealing with the originator. 60
The failure to perfect, in accordance with the requirements of the
VCC, can have serious consequences. The secured party or purchaser
may not be able to enforce its rights as against later secured creditors
who file financing statements covering the same receivables or as
against the originator's trustee in bankruptcy.61
Curiously, although section 9-102 of the VCC refers to transfers
of "accounts" and "chattel paper," it does not refer to, and therefore
by its terms does not apply to, sales of other types of payment
streams. "Account" is defined in VCC section 9-106 as "any right to
payment for goods sold or leased or for services rendered which is not
evidenced by an instrument or chattel paper, whether or not it has
been earned by performance." "Chattel paper" is defined in VCC section 9-105( 1)(b) as follows:
"Chattel paper" means a writing or writings which evidence both a

58 Louisiana has not adopted the Uniform Commercial Code as such. However, Articles 1,
3, 4, 5, 7, and 8 of the UCC have been adopted in substance as title 10, Commercial Laws, of
the Louisiana Revised Statutes, chapters 1,3,4 and 5 (Act No. 92 of 1974, effective January 1,
1975), Acts No. 164, 165 of 1978 (effective January 1, 1979); Article 9 was adopted by Act No.
528 of 1988, effective July 1, 1989, effective date extended to January 1, 1990 by No. 12 of the
1989 Extraordinary Session. U.C.c. Rep. Servo (Callaghan), State Correlation Tables, Louisiana (1989).
59 Chattel paper, however, also can be perfected by the secured party or buyer taking possession of the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-305 (1989).
60 Any argument that the filing of UCC-l financing statements indicates the parties' inten. tion that the transaction constitutes a secured loan and not a sale can be obviated by stating on
the financing statement that the intention is to create a sale and that the filing is being made
because the UCC requires it.
61 See Bankruptcy Code, 11 U.S.C. § 544(a) (1988); In re Communications Co. of Am., 84
Bankr. 822, 824 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988); In re Kambourelis, 8 Bankr. 138, 141 (Bankr.
N.D.N.Y. 1981).
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monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of specific
goods, but a charter or other contract involving the use or hire of a
vessel is not chattel paper. When a transaction is evidenced both
by such a security agreement or a lease and by an instrument or a
series of instruments, the group of writings taken together constitutes chattel paper.

Many common types of payment streams, such as fees payable under
a franchise contract, may not fall into either of these categories. Indeed the vee has other categories, including a catch-all category of
"general intangibles," into which any payment stream falls that is not
included in a specific category.62
Does the failure of vee section 9-102 to refer to the sale of general intangibles mean that the draftsmen intended that no legal steps
need be taken under the vee to perfect such sale, or does this failure
mean that the vee was not intended to vary whatever common law
requirements were applicable to sales of intangibles? The vee offers
. ; no clue.
The answer to this question, however, can have practical consequences. Prior to enactment of the vee, different states had varying
requirements as to how to protect the interest of a purchaser of accounts receivable and other intangibles. One line of cases, followed in
New York and various other states, provided that a sale is not perfected where the transferor retains "unfettered" dominion over collections. 63 A minority line of cases, following the English rule,64
required notice to be given to the obligors on the receivables in order
to perfect.
It is unclear, as a matter of law, whether these pre-Vee perfection requirements continue to apply to sales of intangibles that are
neither accounts nor chattel paper under the vee. 65 Such a result
would create commercial confusion because of the varying and conflicting state requirements. Perhaps a better approach is to recognize
that it is the universally followed procedure for anyone who extends
secured credit or is concerned about collateral to search the vee
records. For example, if a company were merely to pledge, as opposed to selling, its intangibles, there is no question that the vee,
which by its terms covers the granting of a security interest in "gen62

U.C.C. § 9-106.
See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 3~3, 364-65 (1925).
64 Dearie v. Hall, 3 Russ. 1, 38 Eng. Rep. 475, 10 Eng. Rul. Cas. 478 (1823, 1827); Corn
Exchange Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. K1auder, 318 U.S. 434, 437 (1943).
65 U.C.C. § 1-103 states that principles of common law not inconsistent with the UCC will
continue to apply. This is the so-called "Swiss Cheese" principle, because the common law fills
the holes in the UCC-cheese.
63
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eral intangibles," would apply.66 It therefore would appear illogical
and inequitable for a buyer that has filed Uee-l financing statements
to be penalized because it did not also follow common law perfection
procedures that may be commercially impracticable in today's world.
There are, however, no decided cases offering furtherlguidance.
Sometimes the payment stream sold will be evidenced by a promissory note or other negotiable writing evidencing an obligation to pay
money. Under the uee, these are classified as "instruments" and,
because they are negotiable, can only be perfected by the buyer taking
possession. 67
.
A further concern arises under the uee where the collections
from the purchased receivables are not paid directly to the SPY but
instead are paid to the originator and commingled, or mixed, with the
originator's general funds. uee section 9-306(4) provides that, in the
event of the originator's "insolvency proceeding" (presumably meaning bankruptcy), collections of the receivables that are commingled
may lose their perfected status and be subject to claims of other creditors and the trustee-in-bankruptcy.68 In appropriate cases, particularly with financially weak originators, collections of receivables
purchased by the Spy may be required to be paid by obligors directly
to lockboxes at banks that do not contain the originator's general
funds or to lockboxes owned by the SPY. The Spy could enter into
agreements giving it the right to take over lockboxes under appropriate circumstances. Alternatively, if adequate lockbox arrangements
cannot be established, an Spy may obtain the right to notify obligors
to make payments directly to the SPY.69
Y.

REGULATORY REQUIREMENTS

Structuring an asset securitized financing frequently impacts on a
number of federal and state regulatory schemes. The issuance of securities by the SPY, as well as an originator's transfer of receivables to
the SPY, may raise the issue of·whether registration under the Securities Act of 1933 (the" 1933 Act"yo and state "blue sky" laws is required and whether, as a result of·such issuance and transfer, the SPY
See u.c.c § 9-102(1)(a).
See U.CC §§ 9-105,9-305 (1989).
U.CC § 9-306(4).
An SPV may be reluctant, however, to give such a notice, and an obligor receiving such
a notice may choose to ignore it until the obligor receives reasonable proof that the receivables
have been sold. See U.C.C. § 9-318(3).
70 Pub. L. No. 22, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C §§ 77a-77bbbb
(1988)). The 1933 Act is hereinafter cited to the appropriate section as amended, and to the
appropriate current section in 15 U.S.C.

66
67
68
69
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inadvertently has become an "investment company" within the meaning of the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the "1940 Act").71
Moreover, there may be special concerns (discussed below) if the originator is itself a regulated industry or financial institution.
A.

Investment Company Act of 1940

Beginning first with the investment company issue, the 1940 Act
provides that any entity principally engaged in owning or holding "securities" must, subject to certain exemptions, register with the United
States Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") as an investment company.72 The 1940 Act was promulgated as part of the comprehensive federal securities legislation enacted in the 1930s to curb a
number of perceived abuses in the United States securities markets, to
protect the public from being defrauded, and to ensure adequate controls and information. Unlike the 1933 Act and the non-broker/
dealer sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the "1934
Act"),73 which focus principally on the adequacy of disclosure in connection with the issuance, sale, and trading of securities, the 1940 Act
is a comprehensive, substantive regulatory scheme. Compliance with
the 1940 Act is generally very costly and burdensome. 74 Accordingly,
registration of an SPV as an investment company is generally considered economically infeasible, and transactions are structured so as to
fall within various statutory exemptions from 1940 Act registration.
71 Pub. L. No. 768, ch. 686, 54 Stat. 789 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a (1988».
The 1940 Act is hereinafter cited to the appropriate section as amended, and to the appropriate current section in 15 U.S.C.
n One can perhaps intuitively understand the purpose behind the 1940 Act if one views a
company that is principally engaged in owning or holding securities as a miniature stock exchange, and investors in the company as investors in stock traded on the exchange.
73 Pub. L. No. 291,48 Stat. 881 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1988». The 1934
Act is hereinafter cited to the appropriate section as amended, and to the appropriate current
section in 15 U.S.C.
74 For example, the 1940 Act imposes the following general requirements on registered
investment companies: (i) restrictions on capital structure (e.g., prohibitions or restrictions on
the issuance of debt securities), § 18, as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 80a-18 (1988); (ii) restrictions
on the composition of the Board of Directors or other governing body (e.g., limits on the
number of "interested persons" appointed), §§ 10 and 16, as amended, 15 U.S.c. §§ 80a-IO,
16; (iii) restrictions on investment activities (e.g., limits on investments in other investment
companies), §§ 12(d), (e), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-12(d), (e); (iv) regulation of advert ising (e.g., filing of sales literature with the Securities and Exchange Commission), § 24(b), as
amended,' 15 U.S.C. § 80a-24(b); (v) required shareholder votes on a number of issues (e.g.,
approval of advisor contracts, changes in investment policies and appointment of auditors),
§ 13, 15(d), 31, as amended, 15 U.S.c. §§ 80a-13, 15(d), 31; (vi) ongoing reporting and disclosure requirements, §§ 29, 30, as amended, 15 U.S.c. §§ 80a-29, 30; and (vii) extensive and
complicated controls on pricing of investment company shares, § 22, as amended, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-22.
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Under section 3(a) of the 1940 Act,75 an investment company is
defined in relevant part as (1) an entity which is "engaged primarily
... in the business of investing, reinvesting, or trading in securities"76
or (2) an entity "engaged" in such business, which "owns or proposes
to acquire investment securities having a value exceeding 40 per centum of the value of such [entity's] total assets (exclusive of Government securities and cash items) on an unconsolidated basis."77 The
term "security" is defined broadly under section 2(a)(36) to include
notes, stocks, bonds, evidences of indebtedness, transferable shares,
investment contracts, and "any interest or instrument commonly
known as a 'security.' "78
Most receivables and payment streams appear to fall within the
definition of the term "security" under the 1940 Act because they are
"evidences of indebtedness.'179 Nevertheless, several effective exemptions from registration as an investment company may be available to
an SPY. The most frequently used is section 3(c)(5)(A) of the 1940
Act,80 which excludes from the definition of "investment company"
entities that are "primarily engaged" in acquiring or holding receivables that constitute "notes, drafts, acceptances, open accounts receivable, and other obligations representing part or all of the sales price of
merchandise, insurance, and services. "81
Many, but not all, types of receivables will fall under the section
3(c)(5)(A) exclusion. These will generally include the most commonplace type of receivable-trade accounts receivable-since they
clearly represent the purchase price of merchandise. 82 Other types of
receivables may not, however, come clearly within the section
75
76
77
78

§ 3(a), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 80a-3(a).
§ 3(a)(l), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(1).
§ 3(a)(3), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(a)(3).
§ 2(a)(36), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(36) (originally at § 2(a)(35), 54 Stat. 789,
795). Under § 3(a), the term "investment securities" is defined to include all securities except
Government securities, securities issued by employees' securities companies, and securities issued by majority-held subsidiaries (provided the owner is not itself an investment company).
§ 3(a), as amended, 15 U.S.c. at § 80a-3(a)..
79 § 2(a)(36), as amended, 15 U.S.C.§ 80a-2(a)(36).
80 § 3(c)(5)(A), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 80a-3(c)(5)(A) (amending § 3(c)(6)(A), 54 Stat.
789, 798-99).
81 Id. Section 3(c)(5)(B) similarly exempts entities primarily engaged in making loans to
manufacturers, wholesalers, retailers, and prospective purchasers of "specified merchandise,
insurance, and services." § 3(c)(5)(B), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)( B) (1988). Under
§ 3(c)(5)(C), entities primarily engaged in "purchasing or otherwise acquiring mortgages and
other liens on and interests in real estate" are also excluded from the definition of investment
company under the 1940 Act. § 3(c)(5)(C), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(5)(C). It is this
latter exemptive provision which originally was used in securitizing mortgage loans.
82 § 3(c)(5)(A), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 3(c)(5)(A) (sales price of merchandise).
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3(c)(5)(A) exclusion. 83 In some ofthese instances, however, it may be
possible to obtain a "no-action" letter84 from the SEC, which will in
practice have basically the same effect as an exemption from investment company registration.
In Days Inn of America, Inc., 85 for example, the SEC staff stated
that it would not recommend enforcement action under section
3(c)(5)(A) if a wholly-owned subsidiary of Days Inn acquired certain
franchise fee receivables from Days Inn (through another subsidiary),
privately. issued and sold notes secured by those receivables, and
loaned the net proceeds from the note sales to Days Inn to refinance
certain indebtedness of the parent company. The receivables were
characterized as obligations representing part or all of the sales price
of various services rendered by Days Inn to its franchisees and on that
basis were found to fall within the scope of section 3(c)(5)(A).86
Where section 3(c)(5)(A) does not cover the receivables in question, other exemptions may be available. Under section 3(c)(I) of the
1940 Act,87 for example, "[a]ny issuer whose outstanding securities
(other than short-term paper) are beneficially owned by not more
than one hundred persons and which is not irtaking arid does not presently propose to make a pUblic offering of its securities"88 is excluded
from the definition of investment company. This so-called "private
investment company" exemption is frequently used in conjunction
83 The SEC has repeatedly emphasized the legislative history of §§ 3(c)(5)(A) and (B), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(5)(A),(B) (originally §§ 3(c)(6)(A) and (B) of 1940 Act, 54
Stat: 789, 798-99), which indicates that those sections were intended to exclude sales finance
companies, factoring companies, and similar entities from the scope of the 1940 Act. In ihe
case of § 3(C)(5)(B), the SEC staff has interpreted that exemption somewhat narrowly and has
refused, for example, to issue no-action letters to companies engaged in making general working capital loans. See, e.g., Alleco, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter, Ref. No. 88-165 (July 14,
1988) (LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file) (Section 3(c)(5)(B) does not include "a loan that
does not relate to the purchase price of specific goods or services even if the loan is secured by
the same kind of collateral that secures a sales financing loan. "). The staff has indicated, however, that it is currently reviewing "the application of Section 3(C)(5) to various commercial
finance activities to determine whether existing staff interpretations should be refined or modified." Id.
84 A "no action" letter is a non-binding response by the SEC staff to a private inquiry
indicating that the staff of the SEC will not recommend to the SEC that any enforcement
action be taken if a proposed transaction is carried out in a specified manner.
85 SEC No-Action Letter, Ref. No. 88-688-CC (December 30, 1988) (LEXIS, FEDSEC
library, No-Act file).
86 See also, Ambassador Capital Corp., SEC No-Action Letter, Ref. No. 86-402-CC (Sept.
4, 1986) (LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file) (purchase of air travel credit card program
accounts receivable falls within § 3(c)(5)(A»; Woodside Group, SEC No-Action Letter, Ref.
No. 81-713-CC (March 15, 1982) (LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file) (same result regarding acquisition of equipment/facilities lease purchase and option agreements).
87 § 3(c)(I), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 80a-3(c)(I) (1988).
88 Id.
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with the private offering exemption under the 1933 Act (discussed
below) to place interests in an SPY with a limited number of institutional investors and other holders. 89
.
If no statutory exemption is clearly available, sections 3(b)(2)90
and 6(C)91 of the 1940 Act permit an Spy to petition the SEC to issue
an order exempting the Spy from registration on the grounds that
either (1) the Spy is primarily engaged in a business other than that
of investing, owning, or trading in securities (under section 3(b)(2)92)
or (2) an exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest
and is consistent with the protection of investors and the other purposes of the 1940 Act (under section 6(C)93). Obtaining a decision on
such an application may take several months, and certainly there is no
guaranty that an exemptive order will ultimately be issued by the
SEC. Nevertheless, sometimes there is no alternative if investment
company regi~tration is not cost-effective.
B.

Securities Act of 1933 arzd Securities Exchange Act of 1934

Even if an Spy establishes an exemption from registration under
the 1940 Act, it will still be subject to the 1934 Act and the 1933 Act
to the extent that it issues non-exempt securities. The 1934 Act imposes standards of disclosure and liability for certain types of fraudulent statements or. omissions, as well as registration and on-going
reporting requirements for certain publicly-held issuers. The 1933
Act also imposes standards of disclosure94 and requires the filing of a
registration statement with the SEC in connection with any public
offering of non-exempt securities. 95
In weighing methods of compliance with the 1933 Act, an SPY
will often choose to file a registration statement with the SEC and
issue its securities as part of a public offering. Although such registra89 In placing interests with institutional investors and other entities under the 100 person
or less exemption set forth in § 3(c)(I), care must be taken to comply with the rule for determining beneficial ownership under § 3(c)(I)(A). Pursuant to that subsection, beneficial ownership by a company is generally deemed to be ownership by only one person. In an important
exception to that general rule, however, it is necessary to look through the investing company
and count its ultimate security holders if the company owns 10% or more of the outstanding
securities of the SPV unless the value of all securities owned by such company in all issuers
exempted under § 3(c)(I), together with all securities in issuers which would be exempt thereunder were it not for the beneficial ownership rules, does not exceed 10% of the investing
company's total assets.
90 § 3(b)(2), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(2) (1988).
91 § 6(c), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 80a-6(c).
92 § 3(b)(2), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(b)(2).
93 § 6(c), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-6(c).
94 §§ 7, 10, as amended, 15 U.S.C §§ 77g, 77h (1985).
95 § 5(c), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77e(c).
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tion may take several months and is therefore somewhat time-consuming, as well as costly, registered securities issued by an SPY have
the advantage of being freely issuable to and traded by the public.
If a public market is not necessary or if a public offering would
preclude a necessary "private investment company" exemption under
the 1940 Act, the SPY may choose instead to issue its securities in a
private placement under section 4(2) of the 1933 Act,96 which exempts "transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering."97
If the private placement is made to a relatively few large institutional
investors, such as pension funds and banks, relatively little in the way
of specialized disclosure documents may be required; such investors
are generally presumed to have the sophistication and bargaining
power to elicit from the issuer and its sponsors the financial and other
information necessary to make an informed investment decision.
If the private placement is to a larger number of investors, and
particularly if non-institutional investors are involved, the SPY may
find it prudent to comply with the "safe harbor" provisions of Regulation 0 promulgated by the SEC. 98 Under that rule, the SPY may, in
general, sell its securities to up to 35 "non-accredited" investors and
an unlimited number of "accredited" investors.99 If "non-accredited"
investors are included, it will generally be necessary to prepare and
circulate a private offering memorandum setting forth certain financial and other information required to be furnished under Regulation
D.
Regardless of whether the Regulation D safe harbor is used, securities issued in a private placement will generally be deemed to be
"restricted securities" and may not be resold except in compliance
with SEC Rule 144.100 In general, that rule imposes a two-year holding period unless the securities are resold in another private transaction (in which case the securities will generally continue to be
"restricted" in the hands of the buyer). 101
96 § 4(2), as amended, IS U.S.C. § 77d(2) (originally at Pub. L. No. 22, § 4(1), 48 Stat. 74,
77 (1933».
97 Id.
98 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.S01-S06 (1989).
99 In addition to banks, insurance companies, and other institutional investors, the categories of accredited investors under Regulation D include individuals with a net worth of $1
million or more and partnerships and corporations with total assets in excess of $S million. 17
C.F.R. §§ 230.S01(a)(S), (3).
100 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (1989).
101 The SEC has proposed Rule l44A, which would, in general, provide an additional "safe
harbor" exemption for resales of restricted securities (with certain exceptions) to "qualified
institutional buyers," including banks, insurance companies, and broker-dealers, provided that
such buyers had more than $100 million in securities purchased for their own account during
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Certain other exemptions may be available under the 1933 Act to
an SPY that wishes to issue its securities in the public market but
wants to avoid the time and cost of filing a registration statement. If
the securities are supported by a bank letter of credit,- for example, the
securities would be exempt from registration under section J(a)(2) of
the 1933 Act. 102 Under the more frequently used section 3(a)(3)
"commercial paper exemption," securities having a. maturity of no
longer than nine months,103 the proceeds of which are to be used for
"current transactions," are also free from the registration requirements of the 1933 ACt. I04
The only difficulty with the section 3(a)(3) exemption is that the
central requirement of a "current transaction"105 is not defined anywhere in the 1933 Act. It is therefore necessary to turn to various
SEC no-action letters interpreting what is and is not a current transaction under various circumstances. In general, those letters indicate
that a "current transaction" is a transaction which is undertaken by
an issuer in the ordinary course of its business operations and which
has a relatively short duration. 106
their most recent fiscal year. ReI. No. 33-6839, 1989 SEC LEXIS 1313 (July II, 1989). It is
anticipated that this rule, if adopted, will ihcrease the efficiency and liquidity of the private
placement market. 53 Fed. Reg. 44016 (1988).
102 § 3(a)(2), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 7c(a)(2) (1988). Unlike § 4(2), as amended, 15
U.S.C. § 77d(2), which is a "transactional" exemption applicable to all types of securities, § 3
of the 1933 Act exempts entire specified classes of securities from the registration requirements
of that act. § 3, as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c. Section 3(a){2) includes among those classes
"securities ... guaranteed by any bank," with the term "bank" defined to mean "any national
bank, or banking institution organized under the laws of any State, territory, or the District of
Columbia, the business of which is substantially confined to banking and is supervised by the
State or territorial banking commission or similar official." § 3(a)(2), as amended, 15 U.S.c.
§ 77c(a)(2). This exemption is not often used in structured financings because the letter of
credit typically covers only a portion of the securities.
103 I.e., 270 days.
104 Specifically, § 3(a)(3) exempts "[a]ny note;-draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been or are to be
used for current transactions, and which has a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of wl:lich is
likewise limited." § 3(a)(3), as amended, 15 U.S.c. § 77c(a)(3) (1988). Commercial paper may
also be privately placed without registration under § 4(2) of the 1933 Act, as amended, 15
U.S.c. § 77d(2) (discussed supra note 1(0), but this approach is less common.
105 § 3(a)(3), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77c(a)(3).
106 See, e.g., Westinghouse Credit Corporation, SEC No-Action Letter (April 3, 1986)
(LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file) (proceeds used for equipment financing, acquisition of
personal property through foreclosure, short-term commercial loans, accounts receivable
loans, inventory loans, and floor plan loans aU constitute current transactions); Independence
Bancorp, Inc., SEC No-Action Letter (Feb. II, 1986) (LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file)
(proceeds used for various transactions having maturities not exceeding five years all constitute
current transactions); American Fletcher Mortgage Investors, SEC No-Action Letter (Mar. ·2,
1971) (LEXIS, FEDSEC library, No-Act file) (construction mortgage loans and warehousing
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It also should be noted that, regardless of whether an SPV issues
exempt securities or issues non-exempt securities in an exempt transaction or a registered public offering, the anti-fraud provisions of section lO(b) of the 1934 Act 107 and Rule lOb-5 promulgated by the SEC
thereunder 108 will apply. Accordingly, an SPV would be liable if, in
connection with the issuance and sale of its securities, it employed
"any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud" or if it made "any untrue
statement of a material fact or [omitted] to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of circumstances under which they were made; not misleading."109

C.

Other Regulatory Requirements

If the' originator transferring its receivables to the SPV is in a
regulated industry or is a financial institut~on, the laws, rules, and
regulations applicable to it also may apply. In the case of a bank, for
example, transferring its own assets to an SPV, or underwriting asset
securitization for a third party, the Glass-Steagall Act llO may restrict
the bank's actions. Indeed, the power of a bank to underwrite the sale
of interests in securitized assets is an issue of current controversy. In
1987, the Comptroller of the Currency had determined that the sale
by Security Pacific National Bank of mortgage pass-through certificates, repre~enting fractional undivided interests in a pool of Security
Pacific's own mortgage loans, was not in violation of the prohibitions
on bank underwriting contained in the Glass-Steagall Act. III The
Glass-Steagall Act was a response to widespread bank failures after
the stock market crash of 1929 and was intended to protect banks
from the risks of investment banking activities, such as underwriting.
The Act applies to all national banks and state banks that are members of the Federal Reserve System. The Comptroller's rationale,
however, was that the sale by a bank of its own assets was riot "underwriting" of the type prohibited by Glass-Steagall; and the fact that the
assets were being sold through the mechanism of pooling did not
change this essential nature.
The Comptroller's determination subsequently was challenged
by the Securities Industry Association. In 1988, a federal district
loans with commitments for permanent takeouts in three years constitute current transactions,
but development mortgage loans maturing in five years or less do not).
107 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § lO(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988) ..
108 SEC Rule IOb-5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.lOb-5 (1989).
109 Id.
110 Banking Act of 1933, ch. 89, Pub. L. No. 73-66, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified as
amended in various sections of 12 U.S.C.) (commonly referred to as the Glass-Steagall Act).
III See Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 885 F.2d 1034, 1036 (2d Cir. 1989).
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court judge rejected the Comptroller's position. I12 In September,
1989, however, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the district court's decision and decided in favor of the Comptroller's position. I\3 The court reasoned that banking activities that are explicitly
authorized by statute, and the exercise of "all such incidental powers
as shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking," I14 are permitted to banks notwithstanding that such activities may constitute
underwriting or other investment banking activities. 115 The court followed another circuit court of appeals in including in a bank's "incidental powers" any activity that is "convenient [and] useful in
connection with the performance of one of the bank's established activities pursuant to its express powers." I16 The court held that Security Pacific's use of mortgage pass-through certificates was indeed
"convenient [and] useful" in connection with its express power to sell
its own mortgage loans: 117
There has been speculation over how broadly the Second Circuit's opinion can be read and whether it may have application to
bank underwriting of pooled assets originated by third parties. I18 The
Securities Industry Association, after originally announcing its intention to appeal the case to the Supreme Court, decided to drop the
appeal and to focus instead on lobbying for limitations on bank underwriting powers.119 The Federal Reserve Board, however, recently has
expanded the ability of a bank to underwrite, through non-bank subsidiaries (known as "section 20 subsidiaries," because they are created
pursuant to powers found in section 20 of the Glass-Steagall Act I2o),
certain types of securities (including securities backed by mortgage
and consumer receivables).121 And so the saga continues.
112 Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Clarke, 703 F. Supp. 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
I\3 Clarke, 885 F.2d at 1034.
114 Clarke, 885 F.2d at 1043 (quoting § 16 of the Glass-Steagall Act, codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 24 (1988».
115 Id. at 1043.
116 Id. at 1044 (quoting Arnold Tours, Inc. v. Camp, 472 F.2d 427, 432 (1st Cir. 1972».
117 Id. at 1049.
118 For example, because a bank has explicit power to buy a mortgage loan from a third
party and subsequently sell it, could the bank buy mortgage loans with the intention of pooling
them for securitization?
119 See N. Y. Times, Dec. 2, 1989, at 33.
120 § 20,48 Stat. 162, 188 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.c. § 377 (1988».
121 The Federal Reserve Board originally had given section 20 subsidiaries the power to
underwrite these types of securities backed by receivables originated by third parties. The
recent (September 1989) expansion of these powers allows section 20 subsidiaries to underwrite
these types of securities backed by receivables originated by the bank or its affiliates.
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CONCLUSION

In summary, asset securitization has significant potential for enabling companies to obtain economically advantageous financing
without necessarily increasing leverage. Parties wishing to take advantage of asset securitization, however, may encounter many complex legal pitfalls. A well designed structured financing will minimize
and avoid these pitfalls.
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ApPENDIX

Balance Sheet Impact of Securitizing Assets
XYZ Company
Assets
Receivables $100 .
Equipment $100
1.

Debt/Equity

=

Liabilities
Debt $200

Equity
Equity $100

Ratios worsen
Debt/Equity = 2

But if XYZ Company sells $100 of its receivables:

Assets
Cash $100
Equipment $100
3.

Equity
Equity $100

If XYZ Company borrows $100, secured by its receivables:

Assets
Cash $100
Receivables $100
Equipment $100
2.

Liabilities
Debt $100

Liabilities
Debt $100

Equity
Equity $100

Ratios unchanged
Debt/Equity = 1

And if XYZ Company then uses $90, for example, of the cash to pay
oft' debt, its ratio of debt to equity dramatically improves:

Assets
Cash $10
Equipment $100

Liabilities
Debt $10

Equity
Equity $100

Ratios improve
Debt/Equity = 1/10

